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Understanding the fundamentals of political and social movements
is much more than an academic exercise. As Daniel Yankelovich
explains Coming to Public Judgment, the process of building public
consensus has practical applications for everyday democratic life.
His 30 years of study have produced a handbook for American politics,
corporate public affairs, and serious participants in democracy.
Yankelovich gives us the tools to tackle a conceptually amorphous
question: How does an extraordinarily diverse society crystallize
its thinking into a common judgment?
For some public leaders born with political instincts, like
Ronald Reagan, the question is cruelly technical -- like asking,
"How do you breathe?" Other leaders, like [the first
President] Bush, struggle for clues without ever developing
a nose for public consensus.
A brutally frank analogy is offered by a friend of mine who
is a cattle rancher: "You have to show 'em where you want
'em to go. Don't let 'em get distracted. Take your time. And
keep 'em going 'til you get there." While characterizing
the American public as cattle may not be flattering, this rancher's
common-sense observation, on the movements of large groups,
is no less true. He just said it in 10,000 fewer words than
Yankelovich.
"Judgment" Defined and Tested
Before tackling the more difficult task of achieving public
judgment, Yankelovich defines the goal. Public judgment -- or
improving the quality of public opinion to the point of readiness
for action -- implies that "people have struggled with
the issue, thought about it in their own terms, and formed a
judgment they are willing to stand by."
"It also means that if leaders understand the public's
judgments, they have a stable context to work in." Could
there be a rarer species in Washington?
All of us read polls where the results differ dramatically depending
on the subtle wording of the questions. Yet the distinction
between public opinion and public judgment is as clear as the
gap between America's resolve during World War Two and the lack
of resolve during Vietnam.
Public judgment is defined by the quality of opinion. Here are
Yankelovich's two standards: (1) Is the opinion consistent and
free of contradiction, or is it subject to subtleties, conditions
and vagaries? And (2) is the opinion resilient or is it wishful
thinking?
Because these standards are high, public judgment is rare --
but a democracy can't manage the large issues without it. In
Yankelovich' s words: "Without public judgment, issues
fester unresolved virtually without time limit; with public
judgment issues can be resolved quickly, saving years of strife,
turmoil, waste and danger."
The Journey's Signposts
Yankelovich argues that several critical plateaus or criteria
must be reached for any cause or leader to advance an agenda
to a unified public judgment. The key is understanding (1) developmental-stage
public opinion, and (2) how to move the public closer to judgment
or resolution.
Yankelovich summarized the journey's "seven
stages" in recent articles. More important than the
names of these stages are the concepts they represent, and how
they define 1he parameters for leadership's course of action.
Here, Yankelovich is at his analytical best.
For a sense of his mastery and clarity, a summary of how public
judgment develops is in order. I'll focus on the three principles:
Consciousness-raising, working through, and resolution.
CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING. More than awareness, consciousness-raising
affixes importance and, like a signal, prepares the public for
action.
> Events -- real or manufactured -- are tremendously important
to raising public consciousness. In the modern age, we have
the luxury of simultaneously shared experiences through the
electronic media. A single event, like Pearl Harbor, can catapult
an issue or movement toward public resolution in minutes.
> People, as individuals, need to be able to put themselves
in the experience, or otherwise apply the event to themselves
and their own life. Until Ryan White's very public death from
AIDS, most Americans could not put themselves in the shoes of
someone with AIDS. An innocent boy from middle-class suburbia
became a member of "every family" in the American
mind, underscoring our personal vulnerability.
> One reason issues such as the environment are difficult
public-opinion problems to resolve is the conflicting and unclear
evidence on those subjects. Furthermore, the effects of those
issues on everyday life are not easily understood in everyday
time. They are too abstract, like the federal deficit or the
trade gap.
> The public must perceive that the source of information
is credible. Without credibility, the information will lack
broad persuasion. In 1964, the Surgeon General's report on smoking
provided moral authority for the campaign against cigarette
smoking.
> Finally, publicity is still the prerequisite to consciousness-raising,
Every successful modern movement has been as much a case of
masterful publicity as a study of mass movements.
WORKING THROUGH. After consciousness-raising, "the individual
must confront the need for change," according to Yankelovich.
Individuals have to reconcile conflicting arguments and feelings
-- in effect, come to terms with their priorities and their
contradictions.
The debate on higher taxes versus reduced government spending
offers a classic example. The information and evidence are ample.
The lines are clearly drawn. Americans, by and large, understand
the choices before them and the consequences of those choices.
Now they must sort through priorities and come to terms with
their collective decision.
RESOLUTION. This means coming to terms with an issue. Upon reaching
resolution, the public is prepared "mentally, emotionally,
and morally" to take action and accept the consequences
of their actions. Modern politics has a veritable dictionary
for the concept of resolution: Crystallization, alignment, realignment,
cohesion, critical mass, etc. (In constitutional law, judges
say an issue has reached "ripeness.")
Resolution is, in part, a function of time (as in "take
your time, and keep 'em going.") Opinions formulate and
change slowly. Broader and deeper attitudes change even slower.
And beliefs change slower still: The deeper the view, the longer
it will take to change -- or the more radical the process or
event will have to be to cause quick change.
How Expertise Misleads
When a President does or says something from "out of the
blue," you wonder: Where did that come from? Too often
we see political leaders misread the stages of public opinion
and take action that is out of sync with the public's readiness.
Two recent examples:
Immediately following the Persian Gulf War, President Bush stated
that the next mission for U.S. foreign policy was to bring peace
to Cyprus. Thud. Cyprus?!? So what? That would-be goal needed
a ticket just to get into left field.
Also during 1991, the American public moved quickly to "resolution"
on the economy, clamoring for overt action by the Bush Administration.
More attuned to public sentiment and its electoral consequences,
Congressional leaders -- even conservatives -- begged for action.
Aside from piecemeal proposals, President Bush took no action
equal to the public's demand or expectation. Bush and the public
were out of sync on timing and intensity of effort.
Conversely, officials -- in a zealous attempt to lead -- often
jump too far in front of the public's readiness to act. Because
leaders listen to so-called "experts" and not the
public, they do not begin at the same point of departure. Having
studied the issues for years, experts enter the public-policy
process at their own personal "resolution" stage.
Leaders and experts alike stake their professional reputations
on being "ahead of the curve." But Yankelovich believes
many of these seers do more harm than good: They confine the
terms of public debate, and mislead public and officeholders
alike into thinking experts know what's best for all.
For example, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research has
over 10,000 questions on health care (500 in 1993 alone!). Predictably,
many of the responses are inconclusive or contradictory -- because
the issue has yet to be examined thoroughly by the public. Sure,
academics and Beltway wonks may have sorted out the debate for
themselves; they are ahead of the national health-policy curve.
Ultimately, the public will decide -- and they are behind the
curve.
Yankelovich's theories answer the failings of America's Political
Class. Unlike private industry, where markets judge the worth
of goods and services, politics and governance aren't so clearly
Darwinian. The success and failure of ideas, policies, and convictions
rarely receive the judgeless mercy of the coup de grace. (Indeed,
the failure of ideas is difficult to measure --that is, short
of revolution.) All too often, out- of-touch leaders press forward
upon their failures, increasing the public's anomie and alienation.
In 1993, America's Political Class is under siege because it
is not close to its market. Unlike the auto industry or retailing,
government has yet to restructure to be more responsive. In
a two-party system with a campaign culture stacked against challengers,
the public has felt like "a captive market," suffering
under the monopolistic practices of the national government.
Under such conditions, government will respond more to interest
groups, and less to broad public desires -- which allows a Ross
Perot to flourish. Perot's greatest (and perhaps only) strength
that he remains close to his market. His genius is not that
he can solve our problems (he can't), but that he is a chaotic
mutant of Yankelovich' s democratic political archetype: Humble
servant, doing the people's will.
It is less astonishing that Perot is close to his market than
that other politicians seem so far away. This explains much
of Perot's appeal: No one is competing to better deliver what
he seems to supply.
"What Was Dead Was Hope"
Leaders who master the process of public movements, and learn
to work with the forces of public attitudes and opinions, produce
responsible solutions. They share common priorities with the
public. To Yankelovich, those leaders define representative
democracy. American politicians who ignore Yankelovich's paradigm
do so at their own peril.
So, the next time you read a poll, ask yourself: Does the public
have enough reliable information to make a serious decision
that they're willing to live with on this matter? Next time
you see the President or some other public figure charge up
San Juan Hill, ask: Are that leader's rhetoric and actions in
union with the development of public judgment? If not, how far
along the uneven road to judgment -- on that particular issue
-- is the public, and what will it take to bring them the rest
of the way?
The answers will tell you how steep, and how rugged, the road
to resolution will be.
_________________________________________
Kevin J. O'Donnell is Managing Director of San Francisco Research
Services.
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