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With the release of the 9/11 Commission’s findings on
Thursday, July 21st, a new chapter will open in the U.S. security
field. The attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 may be the most spectacular
and devastating event to convey the true end of the Cold-War
and the beginning of a new age - one focused on ethereal “security
threats” and murky predictions.
If anything, the 9/11 Commission’s
findings demonstrate the inability of governmental security
organizations to properly realign themselves from the Soviet-era
threat to the new world of international terrorism. America’s
modern security apparatus, from the Department of Defense to
the CIA, was constructed in the heat of the Cold War with the
express purpose of containing a single, verifiable challenge.
While the report is, in the words of one Congressman, “not
a blame game,” there is significant blame to go around,
particularly with regards to the ability for public leaders
to adjust their organizations to new realities in the post Cold
War world. Neither the legislative nor the executive branches
of the government did sufficient work rethinking life in an
“apolar” world and the ramifications of asymmetrical
power relationships. Clearly, this inability to reform was costly.
Despite the initial surprise at the audacity of the 9/11 attacks,
there was significant evidence to show that there was a capable
and willing enemy to take the Soviet’s place, yet there
was little adjustment to deal with the new threat: Mogadishu,
Khobar Towers, the USS Cole. These were the names written on
the wall years before 9/11, yet there was little U.S. response.
But there are steps in the right direction.
The debate surrounding the recommendation to name an “Intelligence
Czar” who presides over the entire intelligence community
will hopefully have some positive spin-offs, and if nothing
else, will encourage government officials to assess their current
threat paradigms. Whether or not the change is actually needed
is a matter for legislators and U.S. intelligence community
members to resolve.
The lesson drawn from the 9/11 Commission for all governments
is to flex when the situation demands. When core assumptions
change, a paradigm breaks, or a strategy is rendered obsolete,
it is time for a new approach. One can only hope that the U.S.
government opts for a long-term, hard reform plan as opposed
to a short-term, “quick fix.”
21 July 2004
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