 |
| Inside the United Nations' Department
of Social and Economic Affairs, John-Mary Kauzya
is chief of the governance and public administration branch.
The questions come from Jerry Climer, Frank Gregorsky, and
Alec Kasuya (collectively known here as "PGI").
This session took place in New York City on Tuesday 6/29/2004. |
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (PGI): What can
you tell us about your early years?
JOHN-MARY KAUZYA: I grew up in a very, very
poor rural area of Uganda. If you never visited the poor countries
of Africa, you can’t know what I’m talking about.
When I say “grew up,” I mean up to the age of 13.
Then came six years in a boarding school in Mbarara town in
western Uganda, followed by three years at Makerere University,
in Kampala [Uganda’s capital]. Most of my postgraduate
education I did in France and Britain.
PGI: Do you still have family back in Uganda?
KAUZYA: “Family” in the sense of
relatives, yes. “Family” in the sense of wife and
children are here [in the U.S.].
PGI: Did I understand you to say that one of
your earlier memories is “flying bullets”?
KAUZYA: You probably know the political chaos
of Uganda. In 1972, when Idi Amin took power, I was 15 years
old. That’s when we started seeing guns face-to-face,
and learning how to run away from bullets. All the wars in Uganda
you have heard about, they found me in Kampala.
PGI: As a teenager or maybe earlier, was there
a formative moment when you had a glimpse of your life’s
work?
KAUZYA: I was constantly reminded by my teachers
of the intellectual and academic ability. “He will make
a very good scholar” – at that time I didn’t
know what the word meant!
PGI: Did you like school?
KAUZYA: Very much. But, in terms of knowing
what to do? No. So many things – good, or not so good
– in the modern world I didn’t know, and therefore
I could not work toward them. I only knew that school was good.
Not even when I was sick could I stay away from school. And
I was an “abnormal” reader – not only what
I was instructed to read, but anything I came across, in a random
way. By the time I applied to do a Masters degree, I was convinced
of what I wanted to do.
PGI: How did you begin to think about “change
management” and complex project-execution? Did you have
a mentor? Was it from a university course? Your readings of
history? Where did the original interest in this set of disciplines
come from?
KAUZYA: It came from me – in the sense
that I underwent a transformation. When people see many of the
sons and daughters of peasants from Africa, they do not imagine
the road these people have crossed to reach an international
stage. So the interest in change-management came from me. I
sat down and tried to figure out: What exactly made me cross
this huge road? There must be something that men do in order
to cause change.
And then I started reading. I know that “capacity-building”
is a World Bank term, but it fit within the concept I had: In
order to get out of the poorest situations, someone does not
have to give you the money. You only need them to give you a
level of ability to build on, and then – the rest can
be done by you.
PGI: You were seeking more than economic advancement?
KAUZYA: I knew that, unless I got a PhD, Africa
was not going to send me [abroad to advise or manage anything].
No one was going to listen to any change I proposed unless there
was a paper [diploma] attached to it.
PGI: But there wasn’t much literature
at that time [the 1980s] on change-management, correct?
KAUZYA: There need not be. Most of my study
is based on thinking, rather than discovering what so-and-so
wrote. When I read, it’s to verify whether what I think
is right or wrong; is acceptable or unacceptable; has been discovered
or not discovered. This approach has helped me to “stumble”
onto certain things that people take as original. I prefer to
be pragmatic when sorting out problems – where my pragmatism
can be backed up by a theoretical conviction, then I’m
happy to apply the theoretical framework.
The Four Recurring Roles of Change
PGI: We’re working with Daryl Conner
on a book aimed at public-sector leaders. He has invested 30
years, both as a clinician/researcher, and as a consultant primarily
to the private sector. Among his observations is that some people
are “unconsciously competent” at leading change
– they can’t explain it to anyone, yet they’re
intuitively good at it. The dilemma is that we have more change
to deal with than we have consciously competent people.
KAUZYA: Um-hmm.
PGI: The question then becomes, How do we make
it a conscious “competency,” so that it can be taught?
KAUZYA: There might be quicker ways, or longer
ways. But my understanding is that all methods are good -- provided
they work. I always associate good methods with usefulness.
PGI: Agreed! A change endeavor is not successful
unless it produces the meaningful and measurable results that
you intended at the beginning. A second test of anything we
write about is that it must be replicable. If you can’t
apply the principle in a variety of different environments,
then your results [in the one place] were mostly “good
luck.”
KAUZYA: Yes. And whether you are talking private
enterprise or the public arena, it’s the same concept.
Methods of deployment, methods of command. The good thing in
the private sector is that the danger of turning the “process”
into an output is not there. You cannot begin by aiming at increasing
market-share and, when they ask you to evaluate how you did,
you then shift to the standard of employing more people. The
question is still: Did you increase the market-share by 20%?
Now in the public sector, especially when it comes to politics
– even when you have specified the end result –
the political process reaches a stage where the process itself
is something you can offer as justification. Listen to politicians
when they are requested to justify their performance; the tendency
is to talk about the process and methodology -- they forget
to say: “We haven’t got what we aimed at.”
PGI: In other words, we began by playing soccer,
and somehow it turned into a baseball game.
KAUZYA: Yes, and you convince the audience
that it’s okay, because after all you are still playing
[laughter]. So I see a fundamental difference in what pushes
the public sector and what pushes the private sector.
PGI: Do you look at the process in terms of
personal “roles” that come out again and again,
from one project to another?
KAUZYA: Yes. My terms are champion,
advocate, agent and beneficiary. But when
running a public project, if you put [these things down] on
paper, you are likely to provoke jealousies. When you mention
the champion, some people you might want to support that change
don’t like that champion. As for the beneficiaries,
those you can probably name.
So, when I’m going through a strategy analysis or a policy
analysis, in terms of what I call “actors” who will
influence the process, some I can explicitly show; others I
keep to myself, knowing I will still approach them and talk
to them.
PGI: Your word for the person or group at the
top --
KAUZYA: That’s the champion.
PGI: What happens when you are directed to
advise or help carry out a change project and you know
you don’t have the commitment of the champion or the change
sponsor?
KAUZYA: It happened twice. The most recent
time was in Liberia.
PGI: And your paper [“Approaches, Processes
and Methodologies for Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration
in Post-Conflict Countries”] describes that situation
as one where all of the lower things were done right. But, because
of the absence at the top --
KAUZYA: We didn’t have the champion in
Liberia. His parameters for “success” differed from
ours. He did not have enough political sensitivity to say, “It’s
not romantic for me to manage this kind of poor people.”
PGI: This was the [Charles] Taylor regime?
KAUZYA: Yes. I don’t think he had the
sense of being ashamed to manage a poor people. When leaders
have that sense, they try to do something to support them on
the African continent. Some leaders really think it’s
a shame to preside over that kind of society.
It’s like a family head. I realize the structure of the
family in the U.S. is slightly different – here, you have
this shared responsibility between the two spouses. In Africa,
and in particular Uganda where I lived, the head of the family
is considered to be the man. Now, you don’t just put on
a nice suit and a nice tie and walk around in public –
not when the public knows your family is not well-fed. You will
look ashamed if you are wearing the nice tie while your family
has no food to eat.
When a public leader has this sense, he will struggle to solve
some of the most visible problems confronting his people. Forget
the political speeches you see. I’m talking about real
tangible involvement in the struggle to change things. You did
not see that in Liberia.
Carrot and Stick, Conviction and
Discovery
PGI: One question about your seven-step process,
as it is diagrammed in the “Approaches, Processes and
Methodologies” paper. The precision is quite impressive.
We see “Seven Steps to Designing the National Program
for Strengthening Good Governance.” [NOTE: How to obtain
Dr. Kauzya's paper is explained at the bottom of this interview.]
The one thing missing, or maybe it’s implied in one
of the steps, is what Americans call “carrot and stick.”
Carrots for the good guys, sticks for the bad guys. Or what
PGI co-author Daryl Conner calls “consequence management”
– unfavorable consequences if you don’t go along
with the new program, or rewards if you do go along. Maybe it
wasn’t polite to make this a separate number, but could
you talk about the “stick” part? Getting people
to do the right thing when they’d prefer to resist the
change?
KAUZYA: That model [of mine] has an element
of conviction and discovery [including persuasion] at the same
time. “Conviction” would mean you know what is supposed
to be done, and if you had all the power, you’d go ahead
and do it. The persuasion part is that, even if you know it,
you want to guide the people to arrive at the same conclusion
you have.
PGI: Your term “persuasion” is
what we’d call “listening and reframing.”
Find out what causes their resistance, and then get them to
see options that place acceptance of the change in a better
light.
KAUZYA: And it’s not an innocent model.
It would be a mad consultant who goes into a country not knowing
roughly what should be done in that country. The “conviction”
part maybe you keep on adjusting as you discover. The “discovery”
part is the way you consult. The first stage is that intellectual
analysis – you engage people who have [already] got the
concept. What you avoid is telling people that this is where
you are.
But you still have to know, from an intellectual point of view,
with scientific analysis, how the society is, from a historical
point of view, with a rough idea of where it wants to go.
And then the next part is to discover and sort of map that “image”
you have discovered through intellectual analysis, through participation.
You reach a point where you either adjust it slightly, or maybe
it’s the same.
Now if you meet people who don’t want – you see,
people cannot refuse to do it unless they know it. And
you can see that they don’t know it up to the end. Because
at each stage you are adding [support]. You are saying, “Do
you believe this is a problem? If you believe it is, then what
can we do?”
PGI: Okay, so you’re persuading people
that some action is needed. And you know in your mind
what the specific action is?
KAUZYA: Correct. But you don’t want to
lay that down too early. For one thing, even if you are totally
convinced of both problem and solution, you are not sure people
will follow you – [which means your specific intention]
might be a disaster if you insist on it. Two – if you
yourself are not actually sure that that’s the
problem [four-way laughter]. So, this process helps you to solidify
your conviction, or to shift those parts that are not right.
Now the interesting thing is that the discovery is also [occurring
on the part of] the people being engaged. Right up to the end,
there’s a lot of discussion. And most likely at the end
everyone will have seen that their interests are taken care
of. With a good number of individuals, its not so much understanding
that something is or is not a problem, it’s more their
thinking: “Even if this is the problem and you
have a [plausible] solution, my interests are not being taken
care of, so I must reject it.”
Resisting Even Something in their
Best Interest
PGI: All of the steps you’re describing,
we would agree with. Be flexible. Take in new information. Modifying
your objectives. Persuading each group over time, reframing,
etc.
KAUZYA: Um-hmm.
PGI: Yet change will always be resisted, even
when its positive change. Here and there, you will have to manage
the consequences of people’s behaviors, in both the negative
and positive way. Those who are going along with you, don’t
they need a reward?
KAUZYA: Um-hmm!
PGI: But some will resist -- resist even what’s
in their best interest. Do you make an example of those individuals,
or those forces?
KAUZYA: No. You make it “in here”
[pointing to his head]. Don’t make that process look like
a parliamentary process where you record that “Me, I disagree.”
If I record you as having disagreed, [the dissent] starts with
one person, and can turn into a group. Don’t let that
alignment take shape. The image you want to give is that this
is a participatory process, and everyone has agreed. Along the
way, many will not agree.
PGI: Normally, yes. What you are saying is:
Don’t make a public spectacle out of a resistor. But is
there a point at which negative consequence-management does
indeed have to be used?
KAUZYA: Yes, and that is why you need a champion.
If you go on an adventure -- let me call it an adventure –
with a fixed mind, then what is likely to happen is either a
very pleasant success, or a shock. Okay? Now, the usefulness
of champions is that you can reach a stage where you know that
you have done your work to convince as many people as you can,
through this kind of process, and those that have remained will
require a specific command.
PGI: Right. “Command”?
KAUZYA: Command, yes. Something like: “We
have gone through a process, this is the conclusion, and here
is what we are doing.” If at that point there is still
hesitation, the process is set back – you have to go back
and consult again [laughter]. But you need to reach a level
where you get a commander who says: “This is the process
that we went through, and here is the result that has come out
– “
PGI: What you’re really doing there is
using prevailing thought as your “consequence-management.”
KAUZYA: Whether in [public] projects or private
enterprise, those are the hazards of being a manager.
Advocates Do Not Make Any Final Decision
PGI: Any insights about the type of people
who rise to the top in political leadership?
KAUZYA: I was advising a government for very
long and we had moved a long way – until the government
started toying with the idea of holding elections. My technical
assessment was that the time was not good for elections, because
of the sentiments in society. “Voting” is not just
putting a ballot in a box; it has all sorts of consequences.
PGI: Right.
KAUZYA: So, when we were alone, I told the
President: “You know I am an admirer of democracy; that’s
why I am an advisor on governance. But this year and next year
people will [not be ready for] elections.” And he looked
at me and said: “I think I will do it.” I knew that
to keep on arguing was useless. When you are an advisor on change,
or an advocate of change, you need to know that you still don’t
have the power to take the final decision.
PGI: Absolutely.
KAUZYA: You also need to know that, however
technically competent you are, limitations exist. Someone might
have an edge over you in assessing the situation, even without
going through the technical analysis. And, as it turns out,
that President was right. That country held elections, nothing
bad happened, and he’s enjoying more legitimacy. I congratulated
him and apologized for having got it wrong. But he told me he
understood my analysis and took a political risk, because that’s
why he was a President.
[Four-way laughter]
PGI: That’s why it goes back to the competency
of the -- our word Sponsor, your word Champion. One of the Champion’s
critical roles is to have that intuitive knowledge of exactly
how resilient his people can be, and are, in the circumstance.
KAUZYA: Yes. You see, when you are seated in
an analytical position, you enjoy the privilege of only analyzing.
You should be in a predisposition to know that this is a foolish
decision, and a person who’s not foolish should not have
taken it. You can also know that this decision has proved foolish
– but at the beginning, anyone would have taken it, not
knowing that it would prove foolish.
PGI: Right.
KAUZYA: That’s why even the best leaders
make blunders. But it’s only the bad ones who keep on
making blunders every time they try to make a decision [laughter].
As I said, managing in the public arena is not like a private
enterprise where the analysis is always right, or in most cases.
In the public arena, things shift, in an unexpected way, every
now and then. You cannot wait for all the things to be stable
to make the decision.
People who sit at the top of countries, they show a responsibility
that common people don’t understand. In fact, I tell some
of my friends that Presidents are made of materials you don’t
know. They stomach things you can’t stomach, and they
do things you can’t do. They take decisions we can’t
take. And the only thing we have is the comfort of criticizing
then when [decisions] go wrong, or applauding when they go right.
But really they go through a very, very hard time.
First Time Deployed in a Muslim Country
KAUZYA: When we analyze the decisions of big
public leaders, we have got a thing that we can’t easily
evaluate -- the time element. When you plan for the future,
there’s a certain element of uncertainty. It’s like
running at top speed towards – where? You don’t
know. You can reach a point and say now, “This place is
too far, I’m tired, let me go back.”
But actually as you do that – maybe the place is around
the corner! A good example is structural adjustment [as promoted]
by the World Bank. Most of the things being proposed caused
strikes in some countries and the [new policies] were reversed.
In some other places, governments refused to reverse them –
and now we are beginning to see positive results. About 10 years
later! It’s the same thing as turning back because you
think it is too far or you are too tired to continue. So there
is an element of time --
PGI: Yes, right.
KAUZYA: -- in the implementation of these hard
decisions that you can’t easily evaluate. Because you
don’t know when the positive things will come.
PGI: You told us [earlier] that you admire
this individual opportunity characteristic of the U.S. In many
places around the world the individual is not the center. For
religious or just cultural beliefs, some people believe the
whole is the defining factor. What happens when western ideas
are, by their very nature, counter to the culture? If you are
promoting a change counter to the basic culture of a society,
the probability is very high that you will fail. Changing how
the bookkeeping is done is much easier than changing core beliefs.
KAUZYA: The change can be gradual, or the change
can be shock. I give an electric shock to someone who is about
to die, and he wakes up.
Here’s an example from an Islamic country. I was on a
mission in Somaliland, the northern part of Somalia, which decided
to rebel against Somalia. That was my first time deployed in
a Muslim country and, knowing how Islam can be strict, I had
a fear of how I was going to behave. Especially my change agenda
– how am I going to advise them?
The first shock I got was along the streets. At that time, there
was no central bank, no Forex [foreign exchange] bureau, nothing.
So along the street were transparent boxes, divided into two
– one containing Somaliland money, the other containing
American dollars – transparent. And behind each box, on
the streets like when you go to an African country and see them
selling tomatoes on the street, there are women. Only women!
I didn’t see any man selling foreign exchange on the street,
only women.
So I asked the chairman of the Public Service Commission: How
come? He said, “Look, the men died. There are no men.
So, in every aspect of life, only women. If we don’t use
women, we are finished.”
It is hopeless to keep women out of certain activities when
there are no men to do them, and the women were doing the activities
[in Somaliland] quite fine. So, you can have shock – shock
beginnings of change like that – or you can have gradual
beginnings.
PGI: Have you seen anywhere else, Islam or
otherwise, where that kind of change in women’s opportunity
came about?
KAUZYA: In Rwanda, yes. You know, in most cultural
settings in Africa, women don’t inherit; the properties
in every family belong to a man. But again, in Rwanda, after
the genocide, many families were headed by women. You can say
they don’t have property – then who has, if the
man is not there? So they had to quickly change their law. Now
the women inherit; they changed the inheritance laws. The women
own the land now. If you’re a family and you have land
and you want to divide it, you must give some of it to the girls.
That used not to be the case. Another shock way of introducing
change.
While in Uganda, it was negotiated. Even now [the Parliament
is still discussing] what to do with the land – how to
change the “family law” concerning the division
of land. Because the Ugandan way was not [transformed by shock].
It is negotiation, consultation, and persuasion.
Twenty Years of Wasted Thinking Power
PGI: In one way it sounds like you are describing
an ultimate crisis -- epidemics, civil war -- that has to exist
for cultural change to be feasible. And even then the African
continent has lost millions to AIDS. What was it about leadership
that did not cause, or did not enable, those leaders to move
the country to change cultural beliefs and behaviors earlier,
before they lost huge portions of their population?
KAUZYA: From a leadership point of view, it’s
an issue of what were originally [stated as the] objectives
or goals to be pursued. What was the level of leadership commitment
to those goals?
There was a period in Africa where Africa was pursuing other
people’s objectives, not their own. This quarrel [about]
whether there should be capitalist or communist [frameworks]
– it was a very long argument for African leaders. And
I don’t know why they couldn’t quickly figure out
they don’t have to be caught in that dilemma.
All they needed to do is say, “Look, this issue is not
about communism or capitalism. We have people who are not educated,
we have to give education to them. Whether we are capitalist
or communist, we have to get them education.” But they
didn’t think in those terms. So they spent a lot of thinking
power. Read all the literature of the 1960s -- the thinking
capacity was spent on arguing out the issue of communist or
capitalism as the models of development.
PGI: Ideology as opposed to pragmatic goal-setting?
KAUZYA: Yes, and I think they were wrong to
have done that. To me, the thing was simple. You had people
who were poor; you had to figure out how to get them out of
poverty. Not to think of people who were poor in terms of “people
who don’t have money,” but in terms of people who
don’t have clean water, people who are not educated. So,
it was a lost decade.
And then there was an annoyance resulting from that kind of
argument. I think I’m oversimplifying, but to a certain
extent it’s also true – the military coups we saw
in the ‘70s and the late ‘60s were a reaction to
this kind of leadership.
PGI: Hmmm.
KAUZYA: And I’m saying it was a reaction,
it wasn’t a solution. The military coups did not bring
any better leadership. The colonialists were replaced by the
people who weren’t prepared to quickly think through the
problems and find pragmatic solutions. And these ones were [then]
replaced by military leaders who were no better, to do the same
thing.
It’s only recently that you see people in positions of
leadership in certain countries who can focus on what to do.
PGI: But is that a question of people being
incompetent at leading change, or their being incompetent at
deciding what needs to change?
KAUZYA: No, they misconceived the whole issue
of change. After the colonialism, I think most African leaders
thought it as enough to replace the colonialists, in terms of
positions. The euphoria of political independence was a misconception
of what “replacement” means. Replacement should
have gone beyond just exchanging guards or leaders.
Take South Africa. People praise Mandela, but he came to power
at a time when “replacement” did not necessarily
mean shifting from a white president to a black president. You
had to do something more. And that’s why Mandela did not
think it was worthwhile sticking to chair -- after all,
that’s not exactly what he came to do.
PGI: He set the expectations that said, in
essence, just changing who’s in charge is not going to
change the country. He did a nice job of communicating “there’s
an enormous amount of work to be done.”
KAUZYA: Um-hmm, right.
To come back to what I said about the relationship between the
evaluation of a change process and the time element, South Africa
is on a timeline where we [still] need to wait. I have been
working in South Africa, and I know the problems they face.
But they solved the problem that was blocking any pragmatic
solution that they could have thought about, which had to do
with apartheid. It was blocking any solution one would think
of. Removing it was a big step to allow those that can think
what to do, and do something.
The first time I went there I was a little bit taken aback by
the levels of poverty; it was a kind of poverty I had never
seen in any other African country. I didn’t know
that there was a poverty of that nature; I knew the poverty
we had in rural Uganda and other countries, but not that
kind. But I also know the strategies they have in place to do
things about it. In South Africa, it’s a matter of time.
Time -- to judge whether this kind of change that Mandela launched
will be sustainable.
I would not compare the South African situation [from the 1990s
on] with what happened after the independence in Africa. Because
it seems that Mandela knew that change meant more than just
replacing a white president. He knew.
Mistakes and Resilience in Tanzania
PGI: Any other African cases, say over the
past 20-25 years, that really stand out – whether you
were in there helping, or just reading about from a distance
– that makes good positive examples?
KAUZYA: In sub-Saharan Africa, one would look
at Tanzania. You know that [Julius] Nyerere was not an insignificant
leader. He pushed a certain ideological disposition –
African Socialism – from a sincere point of view.
PGI: He was what we call a Committed Sponsor.
KAUZYA: Yes! Up to a point where he himself
– having convinced the whole nation over a long period
of time – realized it wasn’t going to work. And
he withdrew, saying: “I don’t know any other model.
I have pushed the one I thought was right, it has refused to
work, someone else should come and push an alternative.”
I admired Nyerere for that decision. And I remember the last
conference we had where he gave a keynote address. I wished
that every African president could be there. He said: “You
all think I am an example of good leadership in Africa. You
are deceived. Two things no African leaders should ever do,
and I have done both” [smiling]. “One, I thought
for 20 years that I was right and everyone else was wrong –
that’s not possible.” He was talking about his push
for African Socialism. “Two, I spent 23 years in power.
No one should ever do that.”
But the political unity, the social unity, that he created in
Tanzania – the “togetherness” of the country,
contrary to the ethnic rivalry – has made it easier for
those who took over from Nyerere to apply a different model,
without causing chaos.
PGI: That’s a great example. In essence,
he increased the resilience, the capacity for change, to be
brought about.
KAUZYA: Yeah, yeh.
[For a column by Matt Hamel that refers to Nyerere’s 1985
speech and also the political unity he forged, see http://www.opinionjournal.com/taste/?id=110002834]
The Four Forms of Motivation
PGI: Our Institute’s first white paper
contained the statement that “change is a process triggered
by an event.” And after reading that paper you came back
with: No it isn’t, or at least it isn’t supposed
to be. You further go into the characteristics of a leader,
and say that an effective one can “avoid undue disruptive
resistance” or chaos.
KAUZYA: Yes, there are various versions of
“change.” The one that I prefer [does not refer]
to change triggered by an event. You can shift from a position
because you have survived an earthquake, or a volcano. So you
shift. But probably by the time you shift [in response to this
catastrophic event], your house has burned down, or something
worse has taken place.
If you had the capacity to anticipate the volcano or the earthquake,
you would shift. So, same action, same change, okay?
But you would save the house before shifting, in order not to
lose it.
In other words, at the extreme assumption of the change process,
you’d imagine a leader who can foresee the needed changes
-- given the current and the future problems -- and line them
up, so that he does not have to keep on changing because the
event has come.
You see, when you have a change that is “driven by an
event,” you are the one who has been changed! You are
not the change agent; you have not caused any change [smiling].
Change has caused you to change your behavior, to shift
your actions.
But when you anticipate it, and you organize things such that
you’re changing because you had foreseen it, then you
are the one who is the change agent. That’s why we talk
of a change “agent.”
I will give you an example: Again, the Ugandan model.
In 1980, we had elections, and the current president [as of
2004] had just formed his own party. It was such a weak party
I didn’t even join it [laughter] – at that time,
I was still at the university. So weak a party you could not
join it, because you knew it would lose -- and he knew
it would lose.
But he also said: “If someone tampers with these elections,
we will go back to the bush and fight him and remove him.”
The big parties thought he was joking. But, you know, that’s
what happened. So to me I am not surprised that during those
moments, when no one thought he would ever be the President
of Uganda, he had already foreseen the things that could trigger
political changes -- he had started planning, even before they
happened.
Now that’s the kind of leader I was referring to
[in the previous answer].
PGI: Then we’re not disagreeing on the
question of event versus process. As you infer, we think the
motivation for change comes in four forms: Anticipated danger,
current danger, anticipated opportunity, and current opportunity.
You are clarifying the leader’s duty to look ahead and
“anticipate” dangers or opportunities. We are using
the word “process” in such a way that it applies
to all four forms of change environments and are thinking about
how you get from where you are to where you want to be.
The paper PGI discussed with John-Mary
Kauzya is his "Approaches, Processes and Methodologies for
Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration in Post-Conflict
Countries: Selected Cases of UNDESA's Experience in Africa.”
It is one chapter within a UNDESA collection. If you’d like
the latter in digital form, go to www.unpan.org/corethemes-governance.asp
and look for "Analytical Report on Reconstructing Governance
and Public Administration for Peaceful, Sustainable Development."
Clicking on that title will launch a PDF download. The Kauzya
analysis constitutes the fifth chapter of this report, and is
strongly recommended by the Public Governance Institute. |
